Tracing criminal ties and mining evidence from a large network to begin a crime case analysis has been difficult for criminal investigators due to large numbers of nodes and their complex relationships. In this paper, trust networks using blind carbon copy (BCC) emails were formed. We show that our new shortest paths network search algorithm combining shortest paths and network centrality measures can isolate and identify criminals' connections within a trust network. A group of BCC emails out of 1,887,305 Enron email transactions were isolated for this purpose. The algorithm uses two central nodes, most influential and middle man, to extract a shortest paths trust network.
shows the list of criminals involved in Enron money laundering crime [23] , [24] . The ID in the table is a computer generated number assigned to distinct email addresses.
Even though there are 10 criminals in this list, there are more than 10 email addresses as some of the criminals have more than one email address. There are distinct links from each of these email addresses to different recipients, hence we do not merge the email addresses of a particular criminal.
III. EMAIL GROUPING AND THRESHOLD LIMIT
Yasin et al. [2] point out that taking only a part of a large amount of data from a network helps to reduce the complexity of identifying criminals. A subset that occurs within the Enron email dataset are those that have BCC recipients. The bcc-ed email carries the email addresses of some recipients who are kept concealed from other recipients. We will use this categorisation to narrow the search scope, since within the 1,887,305 emails, there are 60649 emails with BCC recipients, giving a sizeable subset. We start with statistical analysis to further reduce our search space. Within the bcc-ed emails, a large group, 17784 emails, had 33.73% of recipients bcc-ed ; that is, approximately 1 out of 3 recipients were bcc-ed. From Figure 1 , it is clear that the majority of emails had at most 5; 1 to 4 BCC recipients. Based on the statistical findings, the BCC email group was divided into two different groups; emails with more than 5 recipients and emails that had at most 5 recipients. There were 34195 emails with more than 5 recipients, with a small number of these emails having large bcc recipient lists. The ratios of bcc-ed recipients in the group with more than 5 recipients were calculated. Figure 2 shows that there were some abnormal scenarios detected when BCC recipients in emails with more than 5 recipients were plotted. For example, 1 recipient out of 948 recipients was bcc-ed. Emails that have large lists of recipients would not typically imply a trust relationship, rather a quirk of the email system or just an information security practice. Thus, this subset was not used for analysis. Next, the emails that were sent to at most 5 recipients were analysed. There were 26454 emails of this type. On average, out of 5 recipients between 1 and 2 recipients were bcc-ed. Based on this, our analysis was restricted to those emails where only one or two recipients were bcc-ed. We called these the 1-BCC and 2-BCC email networks respectively. The 1-BCC network consists of 5290 nodes 17838 edges whereas the 2-BCC network consists of 3766 nodes and 13486 edges. These two subnetworks are analysed in section V. The next section describes the shortest paths network search algorithm.
IV. THE SHORTEST PATHS NETWORK SEARCH ALGORITHM
The R igraph [32] package was used to create a network graph of all emails with either one or two recipients bcc-ed (the 1-BCC and 2-BCC groups). The process of obtaining a new network is displayed in Algorithm 1.
A. Details of terms used and functions
The following abbreviations of terms are used in the algorithm:
C i is a criminal and each criminal is stored in an array, A C . For each iteration, we take a criminal C i from A C as an ego and refer to it as EC i . An ego can be any suspicious entity. In our BCC email network analysis, C i refers to the criminals involved in the Enron money laundering crime as stated in Table I Despite the different subject matter exchanged between a sender and a recipient, a directed unweighted BCC shortest paths network graph is formed where the edge between one node to another shows a trust relationship (see In this section, we present the discovery of the 1-BCC and 2-BCC shortest paths networks and the result of these two networks' analyses. As mentioned before, an edge exists from a node A to a node B only if A sent an email on which B was a BCC recipient.
A. Discovery of 1-BCC shortest paths trust network
We start by investigating Andrew Fastow's ego subnetwork in the 1-BCC network followed by the other criminals' In these small groups, paths don't exist due to two scenarios; betweenness centrality value does not exist or two nodes obtained the same eigenvalue. Similarly, the algorithm drops Lea Fastow (11009) and Rex Shelby (15224, 15225). Following this, the most influential and the middle man were picked from Lea Fastow (11010) and Kevin Hannon (10068)'s subnetworks. In both cases, we obtained the same MI and MM as in Andrew Fastow's ego subnetwork. Combining the results obtained from running algorithm 1, the 1-BCC shortest paths trust network was constructed (see Figure 3) . respectively to other nodes. In this shortest paths trust network, all three of these nodes are adjacent to the criminals.
B. Discovery of 2-BCC shortest paths trust network
Next we ran the algorithm on the ego subnetworks of Andrew Fastow and the other criminals in the 2-BCC email group. Both of Andrew Fastow's (686 and 687) subnetworks were extracted. Here too, the two important central nodes in both of the Andrew Fastow's (686 and 687) subnetworks were (sara.shackleton@enron.com -16383), the MM and (vince.kaminski@enron.com -19075), the MI. In both of Andrew Fastow's (686 and 687) ego subnetworks, only Kevin Hannon (10068) was connected to the most influential and middleman. The algorithm was also applied to each of the other 5 criminal subnetworks that exist in the 2-BCC email group. The result of the algorithm is the 2-BCC shortest paths trust network (See Figure 4) . The position and connections of criminals with other nodes could be used for further investigation. In the next section, we test the ability of the shortest paths network search algorithm on a scenario where an investigator is at the beginning stages of an investigation with no information about who the criminals may be. He only suspects that a money laundering crime is occurring.
VI. FIRST SUSPECT TEST
The first suspect test replaces all criminals with a group of people who are potentially under suspicion. Each combined shortest paths network in these tests is analysed separately and the number of criminals who occurred are counted. The purpose of these experiments is to find a suitable sparse subgraph to start an investigation. We notice that this list of financial managers includes two criminals; Andrew Fastow and Ben Glisan. We assume that the investigator would not know this in the beginning stage of a crime investigation. The next part shows the result of our first suspect test on the 1-BCC and 2-BCC financial managers' networks.
A. Result of first suspect test in 1-BCC financial manager network Figure 5 shows the union of financial managers' shortest paths. In this shortest paths trust network two financial managers, Andrew Fastow (andrew.fastow@enron.com (686)) and Jeff McMahon (jeffrey.mcmahon@enron.com (8071)), occurred. Note that Andrew Fastow was the only criminal identified here with no other criminals appearing.
Louise Kitchen (louise.kitchen@enron.com (11370)) was in between Andrew Fastow and other nodes the most number of times. Meanwhile, Bruce Garner (2058) connects Jeff McMahon the most to other nodes. We also compared the nodes that occurred in subgraphs in Figure 5 and in Figure 3 . The results are discussed in section VII. 
B. Result of first suspect test in 2-BCC financial manager network
The first suspect test was used on the 2-BCC financial managers' network with the same financial officers used as suspects. Figure 6 depicts the network formed when the union of financial managers' subnetworks is extracted using the shortest paths algorithm. We identified the links from Sherron Watkins (16929) and Jeff McMahon (8071) to other nodes and obtained an unknown email address b..sanders@enron.com (1117) and Greg Piper (6667) as active intermediate nodes respectively. Common nodes are identified from the subgraph in Figure 6 when compared to the subgraph in Figure 4 . This is discussed in section VII. Again, no additional criminals were found. 
VII. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

A. Common node comparison
The subgraph in Figure 5 extracted from the 1-BCC email network using the financial managers contains 9 common nodes when compared to the subgraph in Figure 3 found using criminals. Some common nodes that we would like to highlight here are Sara Shackleton (16383), Andrew Fastow (686), Louise Kitchen (11370) and Vince Kaminski (19075) . Subgraphs that were extracted from the 2-BCC email network show 10 common nodes. In the first suspect test, starting with the financial managers, no additional known criminals appeared. However, after obtaining these subgraphs, the next step an investigator can attempt is to explore each of these nodes' history. This is possible because these subgraphs are very sparse and small. Even though these people are not yet identified as criminals during this first suspect test, further exploration of these nodes and trust relationships may lead to discovering events that are related to money laundering.
B. Intermediate node comparison
The active intermediate nodes found in section V-A1 and V-B1 are Louise Kitchen (11370), Michael (Mike)
McConnell (12935), Jeff Skilling (8024), Greg Piper (6667) and Sherri Sera (16926). There were 2 out of 5 persons of interest occurring again when using financial managers as the list of first suspects. These are Louise Kitchen (11370) and Greg Piper (6667). No matter the email contents and number of emails being exchanged, we take all the active intermediaries obtained in section V-A1, V-B1 and section VI as persons of interest. We investigated these nodes to see if they had any relationship to important events that occurred during the period leading up to the Enron collapse.
Jeff Skilling was the president and Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Enron Corporation in December 1996 [33] .
To support Enron's fast growth in the 1990s, Skilling hired the best intellectuals for the company. This accounts for the appointment of Michael (Mike) McConnell [30] , [34] as the Executive Vice President, Technology, Enron Corp., in July 1999. At the end of 1999, Enron Online came into being and Louise Kitchen, a trader at Enron [30] , [34] was the main person involved in its start-up. McConnell later helped to promote Enron Online [34] .
The development of the Enron Online was hidden from the COO, Jeff Skilling by Louise Kitchen [35] with the deployment of Enron online being revealed to him only two weeks before it was launched [35] . and Greg Piper are both connected with Enron Online. Although we can't prove that these identities are suspicious, these interesting and intriguing emails indicate that they should be investigated further. In fact, Louise Kitchen has been identified as an important node in prior research using node neighbourhood search, page rank [8] and rule-based search on the Enron employee's job field [37] . On the other hand, even though Sheri Sera occurred most frequently between Kevin Hannon and other nodes, history does not indicate that she should be considered suspicious [38] .
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our shortest paths network search algorithm is able to capture a closely connected trust network. The algorithm managed to show connections between nodes in 2 different scenarios; when an investigator knows all the criminals and when the investigator is at the starting stage and doesn't have any information about the criminals. The analyses conducted in this paper show that when crime is suspected, our algorithm provides a means of identifying possible people to investigate. It is the first step of an investigation: identifying trusted connections between known criminals or financial managers with other active intermediate nodes in a network. Future work includes testing the efficacy of our algorithm on a larger dataset and combining the node ranking with dependency methods to identify the most trusted node of a known source.
